Reason Quotes (67)
Nihil est sine ratione.
There is nothing without a reason.
There is nothing without a reason.
Attributed.
A fact is like a sack which won’t stand up if it’s empty. In order that it may stand up, one has to put into it the reason and sentiment which caused it to exist.
Character, The Father, in play Six Characters in Search of an Author (1921), Act 1, by Luigi Pirandello. Collected in John Gassner, Burns Mantle, A Treasury of the Theatre (1935), Vol. 2, 507.
All the inventions that the world contains,
Were not by reason first found out, nor brains;
But pass for theirs who had the luck to light
Upon them by mistake or oversight.
Were not by reason first found out, nor brains;
But pass for theirs who had the luck to light
Upon them by mistake or oversight.
The Poetical Works of Samuel Butler (1835), Vol. 2, 289.
Although nature commences with reason and ends in experience it is necessary for us to do the opposite, that is to commence as I said before with experience and from this to proceed to investigate the reason.
'Movement and Weight', from The Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci, trans. E. MacCurdy (1938), Vol. 1, 546.
And so many think incorrectly that everything was created by the Creator in the beginning as it is seen, that not only the mountains, valleys, and waters, but also various types of minerals occurred together with the rest of the world, and therefore it is said that it is unnecessary to investigate the reasons why they differ in their internal properties and their locations. Such considerations are very dangerous for the growth of all the sciences, and hence for natural knowledge of the Earth, particularly the art of mining, though it is very easy for those clever people to be philosophers, having learnt by heart the three words 'God so created' and to give them in reply in place of all reasons.
About the Layers of the Earth and other Works on Geology (1757), trans. A. P. Lapov (1949), 55.
See also: | Creation (44) | Geology (108) | Knowledge (318) | Mineral (14) | Mining (4) | Mountain (29) | Valley (2)
As soon as questions of will or decision or reason or choice of action arise, human science is at a loss.
From a British television interview (30 Mar 1978) quoted in The Listener (6 Apr 1978). In Alfred J. Kolatch, Great Jewish Quotations (1996), 87.
Brutes by their natural instinct have produced many discoveries, whereas men by discussion and the conclusions of reason have given birth to few or none.
Novum Organum, LXXIII
Faith is a permanent and vital endowment of the human mind—a part of reason itself. The insane alone are without it.
A Shadow Passes (1919), 62.
God is a philosophical black hole—the point where reason breaks down.
Quotations: Superultramodern Science and Philosophy (2005), 5
How often people speak of art and science as though they were two entirely different things, with no interconnection. An artist is emotional, they think, and uses only his intuition; he sees all at once and has no need of reason. A scientist is cold, they think, and uses only his reason; he argues carefully step by step, and needs no imagination. That is all wrong. The true artist is quite rational as well as imaginative and knows what he is doing; if he does not, his art suffers. The true scientist is quite imaginative as well as rational, and sometimes leaps to solutions where reason can follow only slowly; if he does not, his science suffers.
'Prometheus.' The Roving Mind (1983), Chap 25.
See also: | Art (24) | Artist (6) | Emotion (16) | Imagination (48) | Intuition (9) | Rational (8) | Science (433) | Solution (41)
I believe in man in his strength, his possibilities, and his reason.
See also: | Man (107)
I like to browse in occult bookshops if for no other reason than to refresh my commitment to science.
The Dreams of Reason: The Computer and the Rise of the Science of Complexity (1988). In Adam Frank, The Constant Fire (2009), 35.
I prefer rationalism to atheism. The question of God and other objects-of-faith are outside reason and play no part in rationalism, thus you don't have to waste your time in either attacking or defending.
In Isaac Asimov and Janet Asimov (ed.), It's Been a Good Life (2002), 21. Attribution uncertain. If you know an original print citation, please contact Webmaster.
I was there when Abbe Georges Lemaître first proposed this [Big Bang] theory. ... There is no rational reason to doubt that the universe has existed indefinitely, for an infinite time. .... It is only myth that attempts to say how the universe came to be, either four thousand or twenty billion years ago.
[Expressing his belief that the Big Bang is a myth devised to explain creation. He said he heard Lemaître (who was, at the time both a member of the Catholic hierarchy and an accomplished scientist) say in private that this theory was a way to reconcile science with St. Thomas Aquinas' theological dictum of creatio ex nihilo—creation out of nothing.]
[Expressing his belief that the Big Bang is a myth devised to explain creation. He said he heard Lemaître (who was, at the time both a member of the Catholic hierarchy and an accomplished scientist) say in private that this theory was a way to reconcile science with St. Thomas Aquinas' theological dictum of creatio ex nihilo—creation out of nothing.]
Quoted in Anthony L. Peratt, 'Dean of the Plasma Dissidents', Washington Times, supplement: The World and I (May 1988),196.
See also: | Saint Thomas Aquinas (8) | Attempt (3) | Big Bang (15) | Creatio Ex Nihilo (2) | Creation (44) | Doubt (24) | Exist (4) | Infinite (10) | Monsignor Georges Lemaître (5) | Myth (14) | Rational (8) | Theology (8) | Theory (170) | Time (50) | Universe (134) | Universe (134)
I write for the same reason I breathe–because if I didn't, I would die.
Isaac Asimov, Stanley Asimov (ed.), Yours, Isaac Asimov: a Lifetime of Letters (1995), 8.
Idealism is the highest form of reason.
If everything in chemistry is explained in a satisfactory manner without the help of phlogiston, it is by that reason alone infinitely probable that the principle does not exist; that it is a hypothetical body, a gratuitous supposition; indeed, it is in the principles of good logic, not to multiply bodies without necessity.
'Reflexions sur le phlogistique', Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences, 1783, 505-38. Reprinted in Oeuvres de Lavoisier (1864), Vol. 2, 623, trans. M. P. Crosland.
See also: | Chemistry (85) | Explanation (17) | Hypothesis (76) | Logic (64) | Necessity (15) | Phlogiston (5) | Principle (26) | Probability (32) | Supposition (3)
If we do discover a complete theory, it should be in time understandable in broad principle by everyone ... Then we shall all, philosophers, scientists and just ordinary people, be able to take part in the discussion of why it is that we and the universe exist. If we find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason—for then we would know the mind of God.
A Brief History of Time (1988), 191.
See also: | Answer (21) | Complete (4) | Discovery (159) | Discussion (8) | Exist (4) | God (120) | Layman (2) | Philosopher (31) | Principle (26) | Scientist (65) | Theory (170) | Triumph (5) | Understanding (94) | Universe (134)
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (1894), section 12, part 3, 165.
See also: | Abstract (5) | Existence (40) | Experiment (183) | Fact (134) | Flame (5) | Illusion (3) | Number (44) | Quantity (3) | Sophistry (2)
In attempting to explain geological phenomena, the bias has always been on the wrong side; there has always been a disposition to reason á priori on the extraordinary violence and suddenness of changes, both in the inorganic crust of the earth, and in organic types, instead of attempting strenuously to frame theories in accordance with the ordinary operations of nature.
Letter to Rev. W. Whewell (7 Mar 1837). Quoted in Mrs Lyell (ed.), Life, Letters and Journals of Sir Charles Lyell, Bart (1881), Vol. 2, 3.
In history an additional result is commonly produced by human actions beyond that which they aim at and obtain—that which they immediately recognize and desire. They gratify their own interest; but something further is thereby accomplished, latent in the actions in question, though not present to their consciousness, and not included in their design... This may be called the cunning of reason [List der Vemunft].
The Philosophy of History (1837), 27-33.
See also: | Result (25)
In our search after the Knowledge of Substances, our want of Ideas, that are suitable to such a way of proceeding, obliges us to a quite different method. We advance not here, as in the other (where our abstract Ideas are real as well as nominal Essences) by contemplating our Ideas, and considering their Relations and Correspondencies; that helps us very little, for the Reasons, and in another place we have at large set down. By which, I think it is evident, that Substances afford Matter of very little general Knowledge; and the bare Contemplation of their abstract Ideas, will carry us but a very little way in the search of Truth and Certainty. What then are we to do for the improvement of our Knowledge in Substantial beings? Here we are to take a quite contrary Course, the want of Ideas of their real essences sends us from our own Thoughts, to the Things themselves, as they exist.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Edited by Peter Nidditch (1975), Book 4, Chapter 12, Section 9, 644.
See also: | Abstract (5) | Contemplation (4) | Essence (5) | Existence (40) | Idea (79) | Knowledge (318) | Knowledge (318) | Matter (55) | Method (11) | Relation (5) | Substance (6) | Thought (63)
In science, reason is the guide; in poetry, taste. The object of the one is truth, which is uniform and indivisible; the object of the other is beauty, which is multiform and varied.
Lacon: Many Things in Few Words (1820-22, 1866), 33.
In the discovery of hidden things and the investigation of hidden causes, stronger reasons are obtained from sure experiments and demonstrated arguments than from probable conjectures and the opinions of philosophical speculators of the common sort...
De Magnete (1600). In William Gilbert and P. Fleury Mottelay (trans.), William Gilbert of Colchester, physician of London: On the load stone and magnetic bodies (1893), xlvii.
See also: | Cause (47) | Common (2) | Conjecture (5) | Discovery (159) | Experiment (183) | Investigation (21) | Obtain (5) | Opinion (33) | Philosopher (31) | Probable (4)
It is God who is the ultimate reason things, and the Knowledge of God is no less the beginning of science than his essence and will are the beginning of things.
Letter on a General Principle Useful in Explaining the Laws of Nature (1687).
It may be observed of mathematicians that they only meddle with such things as are certain, passing by those that are doubtful and unknown. They profess not to know all things, neither do they affect to speak of all things. What they know to be true, and can make good by invincible arguments, that they publish and insert among their theorems. Of other things they are silent and pass no judgment at all, chusing [choosing] rather to acknowledge their ignorance, than affirm anything rashly. They affirm nothing among their arguments or assertions which is not most manifestly known and examined with utmost rigour, rejecting all probable conjectures and little witticisms. They submit nothing to authority, indulge no affection, detest subterfuges of words, and declare their sentiments, as in a Court of Judicature [Justice], without passion, without apology; knowing that their reasons, as Seneca testifies of them, are not brought to persuade, but to compel.
Mathematical Lectures (1734), 64.
See also: | Acknowledge (3) | Affection (4) | Argument (9) | Authority (5) | Choose (2) | Confirm (2) | Conjecture (5) | Declare (2) | Detest (2) | Doubt (24) | Ignorance (62) | Indulge (4) | Judgment (5) | Knowledge (318) | Mathematician (65) | Nature of Mathematics (2) | Passion (9) | Persuade (3) | Probable (4) | Publish (2) | Rashly (2) | Reject (3) | Rigour (4) | Seneca (3) | Sentiment (2) | Theorem (13) | Truth (232) | Unknown (8) | Word (31)
It [analysis] lacks at this point such plan and unity that it is really amazing that it can be studied by so many people. The worst is that it has not at all been treated with rigor. There are only a few propositions in higher analysis that have been demonstrated with complete rigor. Everywhere one finds the unfortunate manner of reasoning from the particular to the general, and it is very unusual that with such a method one finds, in spite of everything, only a few of what many be called paradoxes. It is really very interesting to seek the reason.
In my opinion that arises from the fact that the functions with which analysis has until now been occupied can, for the most part, be expressed by means of powers. As soon as others appear, something that, it is true, does not often happen, this no longer works and from false conclusions there flow a mass of incorrect propositions.
In my opinion that arises from the fact that the functions with which analysis has until now been occupied can, for the most part, be expressed by means of powers. As soon as others appear, something that, it is true, does not often happen, this no longer works and from false conclusions there flow a mass of incorrect propositions.
From a letter to his professor Hansteen in Christiania, Oslo in Correspondence (1902), 23 . In Umberto Bottazzini and Warren Van Egmond, The Higher Calculus (1986), 87-88.
See also: | Analysis (36) | Conclusion (22) | False (11) | Function (6) | Paradox (11) | Plan (7) | Proposition (6) | Reasoning (25) | Rigour (Rigor) (2)
Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas; How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience: In that, all our Knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives it self. Our Observation employ'd either about external, sensible Objects; or about the internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by our selves, is that, which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of thinking.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Edited by Peter Nidditch (1975), Book 2, Chapter 1, Section 2, 104.
See also: | Experience (53) | Idea (79) | Knowledge (318) | Mind (107) | Object (12) | Observation (137) | Paper (6) | Thinking (49)
Man is made for science; he reasons from effects to causes, and from causes to effects; but he does not always reason without error. In reasoning, therefore, from appearances which are particular, care must be taken how we generalize; we should be cautious not to attribute to nature, laws which may perhaps be only of our own invention.
'Theory of the Earth', Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 1788, 1, 273.
See also: | Cause (47) | Effect (13) | Error (93) | Generalize (5) | Law (128) | Man (107) | Nature (231) | Science (433)
Newton was not the first of the age of reason. He was the last of the magicians, the last of the Babylonians and Sumerians ... Isaac Newton, a posthumous child born with no father on Christmas Day, 1642, was the last wonder child to whom the Magi could do sincere and appropriate homage... Why do I call him a magician? Because he looked on the whole universe and all that is in it as a riddle, as a secret which could be read by applying pure thought to certain evidence, certain mystic clues which God had laid about the world to allow a sort of philosopher's treasure hunt to the esoteric brotherhood... He regarded the Universe as a cryptogram set by the Almighty—just as he himself wrapt the discovery of the calculus in a cryptogram when he communicated with Leibniz. By pure thought, by concentration of mind, the riddle, he believed, would be revealed to the initiate.
'Newton, the Man' (1946). In Geoffrey Keynes (ed.), Essays in Biography, 2nd edition (1951), 311-4.
See also: | Birth (13) | Evidence (27) | God (120) | Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (21) | Mind (107) | Mystery (26) | Sir Isaac Newton (80) | Philosopher (31) | Riddle (2) | Secret (11) | Thought (63) | Universe (134)
No species … possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by genetic history … The human mind is a device for survival and reproduction, and reason is just one of its various techniques.
'Dilemma'. On Human Nature (1978, 1979), 2.
Nothing occurs at random, but everything for a reason and by necessity.
Aetius 1.25.4. In G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and M. Schofield (eds.), The Presocratic Philosophers (1983), 420.
Perhaps the best reason for regarding mathematics as an art is not so much that it affords an outlet for creative activity as that it provides spiritual values. It puts man in touch with the highest aspirations and lofiest goals. It offers intellectual delight and the exultation of resolving the mysteries of the universe.
Mathematics: a Cultural Approach (1962), 671. Quoted in H. E. Hunter, The Divine Proportion (1970), 6.
See also: | Art (24) | Aspiration (2) | Creative (2) | Delight (5) | Goal (10) | Intellect (47) | Man (107) | Mathematics (217) | Mystery (26) | Spiritual (2) | Universe (134)
Reason and free inquiry are the only effectual agents against error.
Thomas Jefferson and Albert Ellery Bergh (ed.), The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (1905), Vols 1, 221.
Reason can answer questions, but imagination has to ask them.
In Kurt Hanks and Jay A. Parry, Wake Up Your Creative Genius (1991), 79.
Reason is immortal, all else is mortal.
Quoted in Robert J. Scully, The Demon and the Quantum (2007), 11.
Reason is just as cunning as she is powerful. Her cunning consists principally in her mediating activity, which, by causing objects to act and re-act on each other in accordance with their own nature, in this way, without any direct interference in the process, carries out reason's intentions.
Die Logik (1840), 382.
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
A Treatise on Human Nature (1739-40), ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (1888), book 2, part 3, section 3, 415.
See also: | Passion (9)
Science rests on reason and experiment, and can meet an opponent with calmness; [but] a creed is always sensitive.
Thomas Carlyle: a History of his Life in London, 1834-1881 (1884), Vol. 2, 207.
Science when well-digested is nothing but good sense and reason.
'Maxims, No. 43'. In Jehiel Keeler Hoyt, The Cyclopedia of Practical Quotations (1881, 1896), 538.
Sir, the reason is very plain ; knowledge is of two kinds. We know a subject ourselves, or we know where we can find information upon it.
In James Boswell, The life of Samuel Johnson (1820), 418.
Some people have thousands of reasons why they cannot do what they want to, when all they need is one reason why they can.
The analytical geometry of Descartes and the calculus of Newton and Leibniz have expanded into the marvelous mathematical method—more daring than anything that the history of philosophy records—of Lobachevsky and Riemann, Gauss and Sylvester. Indeed, mathematics, the indispensable tool of the sciences, defying the senses to follow its splendid flights, is demonstrating today, as it never has been demonstrated before, the supremacy of the pure reason.
'What Knowledge is of Most Worth?', Presidential address to the National Education Association, Denver, Colorado (9 Jul 1895). In Educational Review (Sep 1895), 10, 109.
See also: | Analysis (36) | Calculus (11) | René Descartes (26) | Carl Friedrich Gauss (52) | Geometry (38) | Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (21) | Sir Isaac Newton (80) | Sense (30) | James Joseph Sylvester (2) | Tool (8)
The cause of the six-sided shape of a snowflake is none other than that of the ordered shapes of plants and of numerical constants; and since in them nothing occurs without supreme reason—not, to be sure, such as discursive reasoning discovers, but such as existed from the first in the Creators's design and is preserved from that origin to this day in the wonderful nature of animal faculties, I do not believe that even in a snowflake this ordered pattern exists at random.
Di Nive Sexangula, On the Six-Cornered Snowflake (1611), K18, 1. 6-12. Trans. and ed. Colin Hardie (1966), 33.
The difference between myth and science is the difference between divine inspiration of 'unaided reason' (as Bertrand Russell put it) on the one hand and theories developed in observational contact with the real world on the other. It is the difference between the belief in prophets and critical thinking, between Credo quia absurdum (I believe because it is absurd–Tertullian) and De omnibus est dubitandum (Everything should be questioned–Descartes). To try to write a grand cosmical drama leads necessarily to myth. To try to let knowledge substitute ignorance in increasingly large regions of space and time is science.
In 'Cosmology: Myth or Science?'. Journal of Astrophysics and Astronomy (1984), 5, 79-98.
See also: | Belief (35) | Contact (3) | Cosmology (6) | René Descartes (26) | Difference (22) | Divine (2) | Drama (2) | Ignorance (62) | Inspiration (8) | Knowledge (318) | Myth (14) | Observation (137) | Question (41) | Real (3) | Bertrand Russell (56) | Science (433) | Substitute (4) | Theory (170) | Thinking (49) | World (39) | Write (10)
The ideal of the supreme being is nothing but a regulative principle of reason which directs us to look upon all connection in the world as if it originated from an all-sufficient necessary cause.
Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. Norman Kemp Smith (1929), 517.
The instinct to command others, in its primitive essence, is a carnivorous, altogether bestial and savage instinct. Under the influence of the mental development of man, it takes on a somewhat more ideal form and becomes somewhat ennobled, presenting itself as the instrument of reason and the devoted servant of that abstraction, or political fiction, which is called the public good. But in its essence it remains just as baneful, and it becomes even more so when, with the application of science, it extends its scope and intensifies the power of its action. If there is a devil in history, it is this power principle.
In Mikhail Aleksandrovich Bakunin, Grigorii Petrovich Maksimov, Max Nettlau, The political philosophy of Bakunin (1953), 248.
See also: | Abstraction (2) | Action (14) | Application (11) | Carnivorous (2) | Development (16) | Devil (4) | Essence (5) | Fiction (3) | History (56) | Ideal (7) | Influence (9) | Instinct (13) | Instinct (13) | Instrument (8) | Power (17) | Primitive (3) | Savage (5) | Science (433) | Servant (3)
The man who listens to Reason is lost: Reason enslaves all whose minds are not strong enough to master her.
'Maxims for Revolutionists', in Man and Superman (1905), 239.
The marriage of reason and nightmare which has dominated the 20th century has given birth to an ever more ambiguous world. Across the communications landscape move the specters of sinister technologies and the dreams that money can buy. Thermonuclear weapons systems and soft drink commercials coexist in an overlit realm ruled by advertising and pseudoevents, science and pornography. Over our lives preside the great twin leitmotifs of the 20th century—sex and paranoia.
Crash (1973, 1995), catalogue notes. In J. G. Ballard, The Kindness of Women (2007), 221.
See also: | Advertisement (2) | Commercial (3) | Communication (14) | Dream (15) | Marriage (13) | Money (69) | Realm (2) | Rule (15) | Sinister (2) | Technology (37) | Weapon (24) | World (39)
The Mathematics, I say, which effectually exercises, not vainly deludes or vexatiously torments studious Minds with obscure Subtilties, perplexed Difficulties, or contentious Disquisitions; which overcomes without Opposition, triumphs without Pomp, compels without Force, and rules absolutely without Loss of Liberty; which does not privately over-reach a weak Faith, but openly assaults an armed Reason, obtains a total Victory, and puts on inevitable Chains; whose Words are so many Oracles, and Works as many Miracles; which blabs out nothing rashly, nor designs anything from the Purpose, but plainly demonstrates and readily performs all Things within its Verge; which obtrudes no false Shadow of Science, but the very Science itself, the Mind firmly adhering to it, as soon as possessed of it, and can never after desert it of its own Accord, or be deprived of it by any Force of others: Lastly the Mathematics, which depends upon Principles clear to the Mind, and agreeable to Experience; which draws certain Conclusions, instructs by profitable Rules, unfolds pleasant Questions; and produces wonderful Effects; which is the fruitful Parent of, I had almost said all, Arts, the unshaken Foundation of Sciences, and the plentiful Fountain of Advantage to human Affairs.
Address to the University of Cambridge upon being elected Lucasian Professor of Mathematics (14 Mar 1664). In Mathematical Lectures (1734), xxviii.
See also: | Advantage (4) | Chain (3) | Compel (2) | Conclusion (22) | Difficulty (16) | Experience (53) | Faith (27) | False (11) | Foundation (9) | Fountain (2) | Liberty (3) | Mathematics (217) | Mind (107) | Miracle (10) | Oracle (2) | Principle (26) | Purpose (15) | Question (41) | Question (41) | Rashly (2) | Rule (15) | Science (433) | Science And Art (25) | Shadow (4) | Victory (2) | Word (31)
The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man.
'Maxims for Revolutionists', in Man and Superman (1905), 239.
See also: | Progress (112)
The science of mathematics presents the most brilliant example of how pure reason may successfully enlarge its domain without the aid of experience
In Joey Green, Philosophy on the Go (2007), 128
See also: | Mathematics (217)
The theory of probabilities is basically only common sense reduced to a calculus. It makes one estimate accurately what right-minded people feel by a sort of instinct, often without being able to give a reason for it.
Philosophical Essay on Probabilities (1814), 5th edition (1825), trans. Andrew I. Dale (1995), 124.
See also: | Calculus (11) | Common Sense (17) | Estimate (2) | Instinct (13) | Probability (32) | Theory (170)
The two fulcra of medicine are reason and observation. Observation is the clue to guide the physician in his thinking.
Praxi Medica (1696), Introduction.
The wise are instructed by reason; ordinary minds by experience; the stupid, by necessity; and brutes by instinct.
In Charles Simmons, A Laconic Manual and Brief Remarker (1852), 273.
See also: | Brute (3) | Experience (53) | Instinct (13) | Instruction (7) | Mind (107) | Necessity (15) | Ordinary (2) | Stupid (6) | Wise (3)
These Disciplines [mathematics] serve to inure and corroborate the Mind to a constant Diligence in Study; to undergo the Trouble of an attentive Meditation, and cheerfully contend with such Difficulties as lie in the Way. They wholly deliver us from a credulous Simplicity, most strongly fortify us against the Vanity of Scepticism, effectually restrain from a rash Presumption, most easily incline us to a due Assent, perfectly subject us to the Government of right Reason, and inspire us with Resolution to wrestle against the unjust Tyranny of false Prejudices. If the Fancy be unstable and fluctuating, it is to be poized by this Ballast, and steadied by this Anchor, if the Wit be blunt it is sharpened upon this Whetstone; if luxuriant it is pared by this Knife; if headstrong it is restrained by this Bridle; and if dull it is rouzed by this Spur. The Steps are guided by no Lamp more clearly through the dark Mazes of Nature, by no Thread more surely through the intricate Labyrinths of Philosophy, nor lastly is the Bottom of Truth sounded more happily by any other Line. I will not mention how plentiful a Stock of Knowledge the Mind is furnished from these, with what wholesome Food it is nourished, and what sincere Pleasure it enjoys. But if I speak farther, I shall neither be the only Person, nor the first, who affirms it; that while the Mind is abstracted and elevated from sensible Matter, distinctly views pure Forms, conceives the Beauty of Ideas, and investigates the Harmony of Proportions; the Manners themselves are sensibly corrected and improved, the Affections composed and rectified, the Fancy calmed and settled, and the Understanding raised and excited to more divine Contemplations. All which I might defend by Authority, and confirm by the Suffrages of the greatest Philosophers.
Prefatory Oration in Mathematical Lectures (1734), xxxi.
See also: | Anchor (2) | Beauty (30) | Contemplation (4) | Difficulty (16) | Discipline (4) | Idea (79) | Knowledge (318) | Lamp (3) | Maze (2) | Mind (107) | Nature (231) | Philosophy (70) | Pleasure (18) | Prejudice (10) | Scepticism (3) | Sharpen (3) | Simplicity (28) | Study (29) | Truth (232) | Value of Mathematics (2) | Vanity (5) | Wit (5)
Tis evident that all reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on the relation of cause and effect, and that we can never infer the existence of one object from another, unless they be connected together, either mediately or immediately... Here is a billiard ball lying on the table, and another ball moving toward it with rapidity. They strike; and the ball which was formerly at rest now acquires a motion. This is as perfect an instance of the relation of cause and effect as any which we know, either by sensation or reflection.
An Abstract of A Treatise on Human Nature (1740), ed. John Maynard Keynes and Piero Sraffa (1938), 11.
See also: | Cause (47) | Effect (13) | Existence (40) | Motion (15) | Reflection (7) | Sensation (2)
To consider the matter aright, reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls, which carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them with particular qualities, according to their particular situations and relations. This instinct, 'tis true, arises from past observation and experience; but can anyone give the ultimate reason, why past experience and observation produces such an effect, any more than why nature alone should produce it?
A Treatise on Human Nature (1739-40), ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (1888), book 1, part 3, section 16, 179.
To him who looks at the world rationally the world looks rationally back.
Quoted in Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History (1953), trans. Robert S. Hartmann, 13.
True religion is rational: if it excludes reason, it is self-condemned. And reason without religion fails of its object; since, if philosophy can find no place for religion, it can not explain man.
'An Essay On The Christian Doctrine of God', Lux Mundi: A Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation (1890), 82.
Truth scarce ever yet carried it by Vote any where at its first appearance: New Opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other Reason, but because they are not already common.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Edited by Peter Nidditch (1975), The Epistle Dedicatory, 4.
See also: | Acceptance (2) | Common (2) | Opinion (33) | Opposition (4) | Suspicion (4) | Truth (232) | Understanding (94)
We hold these truths to be self-evident.
Franklin's edit to the assertion of religion in Thomas Jefferson's original wording, 'We hold these truths to be sacred and undeniable' in a draft of the Declaration of Independence changes it instead into an assertion of rationality. The scientific mind of Franklin drew on the scientific determinism of Isaac Newton and the analytic empiricism of David Hume and Gottfried Leibniz. In what became known as 'Hume's Fork' the latters' theory distinguished between synthetic truths that describe matters of fact, and analytic truths that are self-evident by virtue of reason and definition.
Franklin's edit to the assertion of religion in Thomas Jefferson's original wording, 'We hold these truths to be sacred and undeniable' in a draft of the Declaration of Independence changes it instead into an assertion of rationality. The scientific mind of Franklin drew on the scientific determinism of Isaac Newton and the analytic empiricism of David Hume and Gottfried Leibniz. In what became known as 'Hume's Fork' the latters' theory distinguished between synthetic truths that describe matters of fact, and analytic truths that are self-evident by virtue of reason and definition.
As explained by Walter Isaacson in Benjamin Franklin: An American Life (2004), 312.
See also: | Declaration Of Independence (2) | Determinism (2) | Empiricism (6) | David Hume (24) | Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (21) | Sir Isaac Newton (80) | Rational (8) | Science And Religion (76) | Truth (232)
When Galileo caused balls, the weights of which he had himself previously determined, to roll down an inclined plane; when Torricelli made the air carry a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite volume of water; or in more recent times, when Stahl changed metal into lime, and lime back into metal, by withdrawing something and then restoring it, a light broke upon all students of nature. They learned that reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own, and that it must not allow itself to be kept, as it were, in nature's leading-strings, but must itself show the way with principles of judgement based upon fixed laws, constraining nature to give answer to questions of reason's own determining. Accidental observations, made in obedience to no previously thought-out plan, can never be made to yield a necessary law, which alone reason is concerned to discover.
Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. Norman Kemp Smith (1929), 20.
See also: | Discovery (159) | Experiment (183) | Galileo Galilei (55) | Insight (14) | Law (128) | Nature (231) | Observation (137) | Plan (7) | Georg Ernst Stahl (4) | Evangelista Torricelli (5)
When the last Puritan has disappeared from the earth, the man of science will take his place as a killjoy, and we shall be given the same old advice but for different reasons.
Attributed.
Whereas the man of action binds his life to reason and its concepts so that he will not be swept away and lost, the scientific investigator builds his hut right next to the tower of science so that he will be able to work on it and to find shelter for himself beneath those bulwarks which presently exist.
On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense (1873). Collected in Keith Ansell-Pearson (ed.), and Duncan Large (ed.), The Nietzsche Reader (2006), 121.
You shall yourself be judge. Reason, with most people, means their own opinion.
Essay XVII. 'A New School of Reform: A Dialogue between a Rationalist and a Sentimentalist', in A.R. Waller and A. Glover (eds.), The Collected Works of William Hazlitt (1903), Vol. 7, 188.
See also: | Opinion (33)
[I]t is truth alone—scientific, established, proved, and rational truth—which is capable of satisfying nowadays the awakened minds of all classes. We may still say perhaps, 'faith governs the world,'—but the faith of the present is no longer in revelation or in the priest—it is in reason and in science. (15 Nov 1876)
Amiel's Journal: The Journal Intime of Henri-Frédéric Amiel, trans. Humphry Ward (1893), 234.